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The market  prices of developing  countries'  debts are imperfect
indicators  of the countries'  payment  capacity,  for three  reasons:
the  concave  shape  of the  debt's payoff  structure,  the presence  of
thifi-party guarantees, and the differences in the terns  of
various debt claims. This new model takes those factors into
account
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The market prices  of C ¶veloping  countries' debts  order of importance,  the benefits  of cleaning  raw
are imperfect  indicators  of the countries' pay-  prices  come first from correcting  for the effects
ment capacity,  for dthee  reasoins:  the concave  of different  terms (such as fixed  versus floating
shape of the debt's payoff structure,  the  presence  interest rates),  followed  by the value of third-
of third-party  guarantees,  and the differences  in  party enhancements  and then by the concavity  of
the terms  of various debt  claims.  the payoff structure.
Claessens  and Pennacchi  derive an improved  They find some evidence  that the new
indicator  of payment  capacity  by developing  a  indicator  of repayment  capacity  conforms  better
pricing  model  - using option  valuation  tech-  than  the raw prices  themselves  to generally  held
niques  - that takes  these three factors  into  beliefs  about  which variables  drive a country's
account.  repayment  capacity.  In particular,  they find that
variables  that are often assumed  to be related  to
Applying  the model  to bonds issued  recently  payment  capacity  - such as oil prices  and the
by Mexico  and Venezuela,  they find that the  countries' stock market prices  - are more
estimated  indicator  of payment  capacity  often  closely  (and with the right sign) associated  with
behaves  differently  from the raw bond prices  the new estimteed  measure  of payment  capacity
themselves,  confirming  the importance  of  than are the sc-ondary market  prices of the
cleaning  the raw prices for these  three factors.  In  bonds.
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Figures  331.  Introduction
In 1985, a secondary market in developing country  debt was established. Initially, the
market was composed  largely of rescheduled  commercial  bank claims and served as the principal
vehicle for transferring ownership between banks and, to  a limited extent, other investors.
Trading was concentrated  in the claims on a few large debtors. In 1989, United States  Treasury
Secretary Brady proposed official  support  for debt reduction. Since  then the IMP, World Bank,
and other official creditors  have provided  financial support in the form of credit enhancements
to five  countries  (Mexico,  Philippines,  Costa Rica, i enezuela,  and Uruguay)  in exchange  for debt
relief from the commercial  creditors of these countries. With the introduction  of the Brady plan
in  1989, a  large share of  commercial bank claims have been (or  will be) securitized by
conversion  into  bonds, often containing  third-party  enhancements. This securitization  has greatly
improved the liquidity and efficiency of the developing  country debt market in recent years.
Trading volumes  have increased  from $1.5 billion in 1985  to about  $200 billion in 1991  and the
efficiency  of the market has also increased (as measured for instance by bid/ask spreads which
have fallen by half or more in the past two years).  Mexican Brady-bonds  are now one of the
most actively  traded and most liquid of international  bonds.
The secondary  market  prices of developing  country  debt have been used as indicators  of
relative creditworthiness  in cross-country  and time series analysis. As the market has become
more efficient, prices are also increasingly  used as benchmarks  in the formulation  of debt and
debt service reduction  and/or  restructuring  packages  negotiated  by developing  countries  with their
commercial  creditors. In general, terms on debt and debt service reduction  transactions reflect
prices in the secondary  market prevailing  at the time of the agreement. Because  of their use as
relative creditworthiness  indicators as well as their use in debt negotiations,  prices-and the
determinants  of prices-are of importance  to developing  countries,  the commercial  banks and the
official creditors (that are financing  part of the third-party enhancement).2
Many researchers  have attempted  to explain secondary  market debt prices by regressing
prices (cross-section,  times series or panel data) on a set of explanatory  variables  such as debt-to-
exports  ratio, reserves-to-imports  ratio, inflation,  etc. (e.g., Sachs  and Huizinga  (1987),  Huizinga
(1989), Claessens (1990), Cohen (1990), Cohen and Portes (1990), Boehmer and Megginson
(1990) and Ozler and Huizinga (1991)).  Although this research has provided some valuable
insights, it suffers  from a number  of problems. First, the range of possible  repayments  on a debt
contract implies that an upper limit on the debtor's liability exists (as when no default occurs).
As a result, the (present  value of) repayments  will likely be a concave  function  of the underlying
fundamental  factors determining  the ability  or willingness  to pay.  Option-based  pricing models
can derive the secondary  market valuation  consistent  with this (see further Genotte, Kharas and
Sadeq (1987), Borensztein and Pennacchi (1990), Cohen (1991),  Claessens and Wijnbergen
(1990), Chesney and Morisset (1992) and Bartolini  and Dixit (1991)). This option-type, non-
linear relationship between prices and fundamentals  needs to  be  taken into account when
secondary  market prices are related to fundamentals.
Second,  debt traded in the secondary  market  is not homogenous  across countries  or across
time.  Most research papers make the implicit assumption  that the debts of different countries
traded on the secondary  market are direcly comparable  and, hence, that available  prices can be
used in cross-country  regressions. But, this assumption  is unrealistic: often there will exist a
large number  of claims on a given country, each with different  contractual  terms.'  An obvious
difference in terms will be between  bonds with fixed and floating interest payments, in which
case the relative prices will vary, in part, due to movements in international  interest rates.
'For instance, currently about  20 claims on Brazil and at least five claims on Venezuela
are traded, all at different  discounts. Across countries, commercial  bank obligations  will have
different maturities, different coupon rates, different indentures, etc.  Over time, terms on
claims will vary due to reschedulings  and restructurings. For instance, restructurings  lead to
different maturities, grace periods, and/or interest rates.3
Accounting explicitly for the terms of the bonds can lead to more efficient estimates of the
country's underlying  payment capacity  (as perceived  by the market).
Third, the Brady deals  have involved  the issuance  of a number  of new instruments  with
different forms of enhancements  (from third parties and/or through the use of collateral). These
enhancements  can contribute  as much  as 20% of the total value  of the bonds. Without  accounting
for  these enhancements, cross-section regressions attempting to  explain prices  of  partly
collateralized  bonds  on the ground of country  risk factors alone  would lead  to biased  results. The
value  of the enhancements-such  as principal  collateralization-is  partly  a function  of international,
risk-free  interest rates, not only of country  risk factors. Preferably, one explicity values the two
components:  the value derived from the country's underlying  ability  and willingness  to repay its
debt; and the additional  value of the third-party  enhancements  (where the additional  value of the
enhancements  wIll obviously  depend  on the stochastic  process determining  the country's abiity
and willingness  to repay).
In principle, an analysis  of a country's repayment  capacity  would start by modeling  the
factors that determine  its likelihood  of repayment. This is complex,  however, because  one must
consider factors that determine  both a country's ability as well as its willingness  to make debt
payments.  In  the  absence of  an  international  bankruptcy court (or the use  of  "gunboat
diplomacy"),  the debtor can choose  to make  payments  in order to avoid  the imposition  of various
possible penalties.  These penalties can be intertemporal  (exclusion  of future access to capital
markets, see Eaton and Gersovitz  (1981))  or intratemporal  (trade sanctions,  withdrawal  of trade
credits, see Bulow  and Rogoff  (1989)). To avoid  these  penalties  from being imposed-which  may
generate  little direct benefits to the creditors-the debtor and the creditors will try to reach an
agreement  involving  some (partial)  payment by the debtor.  Since the bargaining  power of the
creditors  will depend  on the severity  of the penalties  they can impose,  the agreement  reached will
likely imply that the debtor will pay in relation to the severity of the penalties.4
These considerations  make it clear that repayments  by the country will be driven by a
large number of factors, affecting  the country's as well as its creditors' position (for example,
the general state of the banking  system  may affect  the bargaining  power of commercial  banks vis-
a-vis the debtor country, see Fernandez and Ozler (159*1)  and Ozler and Huizinga (1991)). A
priori it will be difficult to determine the relative importance  of each of these factors and to
develop an econometric  model accordingly. Hence, empirical studies have typically tried to
identify  variables that best explain repayment  capacity  by conducting  goodness  of fit regression
tests.
An alternative  to this regression fitting approach is to first assume that a developing
country's repayment  capacity can be summarized  by a given stochastic  repayment  process and
then derive a valuation  model for particular  types of debt claims (e.g., enhanced  with third-party
guarantees)  based on this stochastic  process. Using  actual  secondary  market prices  of developing
country debt, one can then infer the country's underlying stochastic  repayment  process that is
consistent  with the previously  derived debt valuation  model. The derived stochastic  process can
then be related to the underlying  fundamental  factors  and some hypotheses  regarding ability and
willingness  to pay factors can be tested. In this way one deals in a consistent  fashion with: the
option-type  nature of sovereign  debt; the different  terms of the various claims (which determine,
for instance, the impact  of changes in international  interest rates on their prices); and the extra
value provided  by third-party  enhancements.
2.  The Model
2.1  Mexican and Venezuelan  Bonds
We develop such a pricing model for the Mexican and Venezuelan  Brady bonds. The
Mexican bonds were created in  March  1990 by  converting approximately $40 billion of
commercial  bank claims. They trade in a very liquid and efficient market (bid-ask spreads are
around 25 cents, or about 0.4 percent of their price). Two different Mexican  Brady bonds exist:5
(i) a discount  bond, a bond with a principal  discounted  to equal  to 65 percent of its original (pre-
rescheduled)  face value and having a floating interest rate of LIBOR  plus 13/16; and
(ii) a par bond, a bond with a principal  equal to its original face value but having a low, fixed
interest rate of 6.25 percent.
Both bonds have an original maturity of 30 years. The principal of both bonds is
guaranteed  through  the collateralization  of a 30-year,  US Treasury  zero-coupon  bond. The bonds
are further credit enhanced  by a rolling guarantee  that covers a limited value  of interest  payments
and is collateralized  by an escrow account. 2 Specifically,  this rolling interest guarantee covers
18 months  worth of interest  payments  (three  semi-annual  interest  payments). The interest  earned
on the funds in the escrow account  accrues every six months to Mexico,  provided  of course that
Mexico  pays in full the then due interest repayment. In addition,  both bonds include  an oil price
recapture clause  that gives creditors  a share in Mexico's oil export revenue if oil prices increase
by a certain  percentage  in the years 1997  and beyond.
The Venezuelan  Brady bonds were created in August of 1990 from the conversion  of
approximately  $19 billion of commercial  bank debt. Their terms are very similar to the Mexican
bonds: a discount bond (face value equal to 70% of pre-existing bank debt); and a par bond
(interest rate of 6.75%).3  Both Venezuelan  bonds also have a  30 year maturity, have their
principal collateralized,  and have an interest guarantee  on a rolling basis provided through an
escrow account containing  14 months  of interest  payments. The two Venezuelan  bonds have oil
recapture rights that are similar to those of the Mexican  bonds.  The Venezuelan  bonds have
2Te  escrow account is established  at the New York Federal Reserve  and only securities
with at least a AA-rating  can be used as collateral.
3In addition, bonds with temporary low interest rates an4 new money bonds (with no
enhancement)  were created in the context of the debt conversion. To maintain comparability
with Mexico, we did not analyze  these bonds.6
relatively  a higher  bid-ask  spread  than  the Mexican  bonds,  possibly  a result  of the fact  that  their
outstanding  amount  Is  less.
2.2  The Analytical  Model
The pricing  of the collateralized  principal  of a Brady  bond Is  straightforward:  its value
at each  point  in time  will  equal  the  current  value  of  the U.S. Treasury  zero-coupon  bond  expiring
on the same  maturity  date. What  Is  then  left to value  are  the interim  interest  payments.  Valuing
the bond's  interim  interest  payments  is complicated  since  they  possess  default  risk  but that  they
are also covered  by a limited, rolling  guarantee. We characterize  the developing  country's
default  risk  by a stochastic  state  variable,  z,, which  can  be thought  of as  an index  of the country's
capacity  for repaying  its debt. If z, falls  below  zero. we assume  that  the country  will  default  on
its interest  payments  for a limited  time  equal  to r periods.
The state  variable,  z,, is assumed  to follow  the arithmetic  Brownian  motion  process:
(1)  dz  = Pdt + adq
where  dq is a standard  Wiener  process.
The  rolling  guarantee  is assumed  to cover  7  periods  of interest  payments.  For analytical
simplicity,  we assume  that  if the rolling  interest  guarantee  is called  upon,  then  it is used  in full,
i.e., in the case  of Mexico,  it is disbursed  over 18  months  (three  consecutive  semi-annual  interest
payments)  and in the case of Venezuela,  it is disbursed  over 14 months  (two and one-third
consecutive  semi-annual  interest payments).' The state variable, z2,  determines  when the
guarantee  is first employed  and when  the bond issuer subsequently  defaults  on its promised
payments.  It is assumed  that  the guarantee  is disbursed  over  the  period  T to T+T if,  falls  below
4This  is not as strong  an assumption  as it may  seem:  it is likely  that  once  the country
defaults  on one interest  payment,  it will  default  completely  on the interest  guarantee.7
zero fr flte flrst  ti  during any time within  the interval  T-r to 1'.  If  , later takes on a value
less than or equal to zero at any time during any future interval  T'-T to T',  where T'  2  T + T,
then it is assumed  that complete  default occurs on all promised  bond payments  over the interval
T' to T'+T.
Our strategy  for computing  the value of payments  for the bond described  above  is to first
value the payments of a bond without  the rolling interest guarantee. Second, we then calculate
the value of the rolling guarantee  alone. By combining  these  two values, we will obtain the value
of payments of a bond thai includes  the guarantee. A description  of this valuation  technique is
given in Appendix A.  There we make the simplifying  assumption  that bond investors view the
country's default risk as diversifiable,  a somewhat  weaker assumption  than risk neutrality.' We
then find that if the initial time t=O value of the state variable is z4 =  z, then the time 0
probability  of the bondholder  receiving  an interest payment  over the interval  t2  to t 2 + T is equal
to
(2)  0)  (-Z  a z+X&ti 
2  e  2"zesN2i  -ZPtl  z-g02 _  V1UV.Z)
where t,  *  t2-r.  This implies that the value of the bond's payments  over the interval  t2 to  t2 +
r is equal to their default-free  value times the expression  0(t 2).  Hence, if we define 1, as a par
bond's promised  fixed interest  payment  that comes  due at time t, where t2 s  t  <  t2+r, then the
time 0 value of this interest payment is given by
5We allow for interest rate risk premia since our model embeds  the Vasicek  (1977) model
of the term structure of (default-free)  interest rates.8
(3)  vOMI) =  pO(t)  I,o(t 2)
where p0(t) is the time 0 price of a default-free zero coupon bond that pays $1 at time t.
Similarly, one can value a discount  bond's promised  floating rate interest payment to be paid at
time t.  Let D denote the discount  bond's level of principal  and let s be the spread over the yield
on a default-free  six month  bond issued six months  prior to the interest payment date (e.g., the
spread of 13/16%  over LIBOR). Then the value of this discount  bond interest payment equals 6
(4)  VI  (D,t) = [e02po(t  -.5) - po(t)] D  0(t2)
These  valuation  formulas  imply  that the variability  of the prices of the bonds will be less
than that of the underlying  state  variable; for an enhanced  bond, both its rolling  guarantee  as well
as its limited liability will lead to the bond's price being  a concave  function  of the state variable.
This is illustrated  in Figure 1 which plots the theoretical  price of Mexico  par and discount  bonds
as a function  of the state variable, z.'
2.3  Estimation  Techniques
Formulas (3) and (4) require default-free, zero-coupon  bond prices, po(t), maturing at
each coupon payment date.  We constructed  this term structure of bond prices using data on
Treasury  bill, Treasury strip, and LIBOR  rates to estimate  the parameters  of the Vasicek (1977)
bond pricing model.  This model then allowed us to find values of po(t) for any time until
6See Borensztein  and Pennacchi  (1990) for details in valuing floating rate payments.
These bond prices represent interest rates and times until maturity  that existed  on March
24, 1990, the beginning  of our sample  period. A value of eu/u  =  -.222725 was assumed,
which is the value we later obtain using our estimation  procedure. The estimates  for the state
variables  z (see below) varied between 1 and 3.  Note that the discount  bond can be valued
above 100 for large values of z because of the spread, s, on the bond.9
maturity,  t.8 Given  these  default-free  bond  prices,  note  that  formulas  (2), (3), and  (4) imply  that
Brady  bond  prices  are a nonlinear  function  of the fractions  z,/o and  A/a only. Hence,  we can
normalize  a =  1, and  denote  these  theoretical  bond  valuation  formulas  as ztZ,; ), where  i =  1,
..., n indexes  a particular  type  of bond  issued  by a given  country,  such  as a discount  bond  or a
par bond.
Now  consider  the  following  strategy  for estimating  the values  of A  and  the time  series  of
the state  variable  z,. Let V equal  the average  of the secondary  market  bid and ask prices  of a
particular  country's  type  i bond  at  time  t.  This average  of secondary  market  quotes  corresponds
to the theoretical  valuation,  v defined  above. Given  that  we can observe  a time  series  of these
secondary  market  prices  for n different  types  of debt  issued  by a particular  country,  we assume
that  these  bid-ask  averages  measure  the country's  "true"  debt  prices  with  error:
(5)  Vt = v,(z,; p)  + et,  t  = 1, ..., T
where  V, is the n dimensional  vector  o, observed  secondary  market  prices of debt of types  i,
i =  1, ..., n, observed at time t and v, is the corresponding  n-vector  of "true" debt prices; and
e, is an n-vector  of measurement  errors.  For simplicity,  we assume  that this vector of
In the Vasicek  (1977)  model,  equilibrium  bond  prices  take  the form p 0(t) = exp[(l-e
at)(r.-r)-tr,. -a,I(l-e) 2/(4ci)J where r and r.  are the time 0 yields on instantaneous  maturity
and infinite  maturity  zero  coupon  bonds,  respectively.  a is a measure  of the mean  reversion
of r and a,2  is the instantaneous  variance  in the change  in r over  time. ca  and a, were
estimated  by maximum  likelihood  following  a simplified  version  of the procedure  given  in
Pennacchi  (1991). This  involved  using  a univariate  Kalman  filter  to compute  the likelihood
function. The data  consisted  of end of month  observations  on 30, 90, 180,  and  345 day
Treasury  bills  over the  period 1968  through  1988  and  produced  estimates  of a=.095k3l and
o,=-.025339.  Given  these  parameter  values  and  the above  bond  price formula,  we then  solved
for the date  0 values  of r and  r,  that  were  implied  by contemporaneous  observations  on 6
month  maturity  LIBOR  and  the price  of a Treasury  strip that  matured  nearest  to the maturity
date  of the Brady  bond  we were  evaluating.10
measurement  noise, e,, is serially uncorrelated and distributed as N(O,R), where R is an nxn
covariance  matrix.
Next, note that equation  (1) can be rewritten in discrete time form as
(6)  zt =zt'It  + "At  + 
where  ,  - N(O,At). (Recall we normalized  o =  1.)  Hence (5) and (6) are in the form of a
generalized  state space system. z, is an unobserved 'state" variable  and (6) is referred to as the
"state-transition  equation."  V, is a vector of observed variables and (5) is referred to as the
"measurement  equation." Now if v,t(z;) were lin=ar  functions  of z", then maximum  likelihood
estimates  of u and the z's  could be obtained using a standard, recursive Kalman filter.  (For
example, see Harvey 1981, Chapter 4.)
However, Pj(z#,)  is a vector of non-linear  functions  of z,.  Therefore a modification  of
the Kalman filter that considers functional  nonlinearities,  called the extended  Kalman filtr,  is
needed to obtain (approximate)  maximum likelihood estimates  of i  and z's  (Harvey (1989,
p. 160) and Anderson  and Moore (1979, p. 195)). The extended Kalman filter uses the same
simple  recursive computational  technique  as the standard  Kalman  filter.  However, it does so by
linearizing (5) around the conditional mean of z, using a Taylor series expansion.  Further
discussion  of this technique  can be found in Appendix  B.
The attraction of this estimation  procedure is that it combines a time series of cross-
sectional  observations  in a theoretically  consistent  and computationally  efficient manner.  The
technique is in the same spirit as Chesney and Morisset (1992) in that it uses information
regarding the assumed  time series properties of the state variable, z,, to impose restrictions on
the time series of observations. However, the present technique, given the extended Kalman
filter's linear approximation,  has known  statistical  properties  that allow for hypothesis  testing or
the computation  of confidence  intervals. In addition, this technique  does not require estimates11
of the bonds' instantaneous  variances as was needed in previous work such as Borensztein  and
Pennacchi (1990).
The most important results of our estimation are a point estimate and an asymptotic
standard error for y/I  and a times series of estimates  of the z,'s.  These "smoothed"  estimates
of z,, t= 1,..,T, make use of the full sample of bond price observations  to infer each estimate.
This times series of the estimated  state variable  can then be analyzed  in terms of its relationship
to other factors affecting  the country's debt repayment  capacity.
3.  The Results
3.1  Raw Prices
We use secondary  market  prices of the Brady bonds since their introduction  (March 24,
1990 for the Mexican bonds and August 4,  1990 for the Venezuelan  bonds) until July 1991.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the raw bond prices for Mexico and Venezuela.
As can also be observed from Figure 2, prices of the Mexico  par and floating interest discount
bonds tend to move together. The two series toward the bottom  of Figure 2 give the respective
bond prices as a percent of their face values, while the series at the top of Figure 2 give their
prices as a percent of their price on the first observation  in our sample. The correlation  between
the rates of return  Oog  differences)  on these Mexican Brady bonds is 0.726.  While this is
certainly  high, and up to the end of 1990  bond prices moved  together  quite closely, it is less than
perfect.  As can be seen in Figure 3, which plots the time series of Venezuelan  Brady bond
prices, these  bonds move  together even less perfectly. The correlation  of their rates of return is
0.445.  Since a developing  country's capacity  for repaying  its discount  and par bonds is driven
by the same set of underlying variables, this less than perfect correlation indicates that these
prices should not be used as direct measures  of this repayment ability.  Rather, prices might
indeed  be viewed  as noisy (non-linear)  functions  of repayment  capacity  as well as other variables.
Figures 2 and 3 indicate  that part of their relative price behavior  may be explained  by interest12
rate movements: at the beginning of  1991, the decrease in U.S. dollar interest rates (e.g.,
LIBOR) contributed to the relatively more rapid rise of the par bond for both Mexico and
Venezuela. This points to the value of appropriately  modeling  the effects of riskfree interest
rates.
3.2  Estimates  of the State Variable  Process
Based on the analytical  model of section 2.2, we employed  the extended Kalman  filter
estimation  technique  outlined in section  2.3.  The data consisted  of weekly  Brady bond prices  that
were adjusted  to account for the additional  value of their oil recapture  clauses. Using the model
of Claessens  and van Wijnbergen  (1992), oil recapture clause  values of 2.11 cents per dollar of
old face value for Mexico and 3.14 cents for Venezuela  were obtained. 9 On the basis of the
above model, we estimated  the parameters of the state variable  processes for both Mexico and
Venezuela based on a bivariate measurement  equation consisting  of each country's par and
discount  bonds. The results are given in Table 2.
The state variable process's drift, ,Iar, is negative both for Mexico and Venezuela
(somewhat  smaller in magnitude  for Venezuela)  and measured quite precisely in the case of
Mexico. This suggests  that in spite of the ex-post rise in the value of the state variable  over our
sample period, investors were pessimistic  about each country's future repayment  capacity; they
expected  the countries' repayment  capacities  to decline over time.
A measure of how well our theoretical  model describes  the actual Brady bond prices is
given by the coefficients  of the measurement  error matrix, R.  The standard deviations of the
measurement  "noise"  for the par bonds,  Vr,,,  are very similar but estimated  with more precision
for Mexico.  This might be due, in part, to the longer sample period for Mexico.  For both
Moxico  and Venezuela,  the standard  deviations  of the measurement  errors for the discount  bonds,
'The values of the recapture clause were calculated  every week.  Since there was very
little variation in the value of the recapture  clause (standard  deviation  of .032 cents for
Mexico  and .023 cents for Venezuela)  the average value was used throughout.13
the coefficients  Vr22,  are smaller than the corresponding  par bond measurement  errors and are
not significantly  different from zero.  We also see that the point estimates of the correlation
coefficients  between the par and discount  bond measurement  errors,p 12, are negative,  but due to
their huge standard errors, little can be said regarding  this interaction. However, looking  at the
matrix, R, as a whole, the result  that each  of the estimated  standard  deviations  are less than $1.80
(on bonds whose  prices ranged between  $40 and $80) indicates  that our model fits the data fairly
well.
Table 3 presents statistics  on the (smoothed)  sample estimates  of the fractions  z/a.  (To
maintain comparability  with Table 1, the standard deviations  of the log differences of the state
variables are calculated here). The volatility of the underlying state variable is much higher,
almost by a factor of three, relative to that of the prices (Table 1).  This is consistent  with the
fact that the pAces themselves  are a concave function  of the underlying state variable. Figures
4 (for Mexico)  and 5 (for Venezuela)  also show that the underlying  state  variable  behaves  at times
quite different from the prices of the par and discount bond.  For Mexico, this is especially
evident in early May, 1990, when the state variable experienced  a much sharper drop than that
of bond prices, and also during the first half of 1991, when the state variable increases more
sharply.  As for Venezuela,  a much sharper improvement  of the state variable started during
December 1990. Since  the effect of the drop in U.S. interest rates on the bond prices is already
incorporated,  in both cases it represents  a genuine improvement  in repayment  capacity.
Table 4 presents the correlations  between  the (rates of return on the) bond prices and the
(first differences  of the) state variable. The results confir  n what is apparent from Figures 4 and
5.  The correlations  between the bond prices and the underlying  state variable are significantly
different from 1; in case of Venezuela,  the par bond price and the state variable have only a
correlation  of 0.529, confirming  the importance  of extracting  the state variable  before modelling
ability or willingness  to pay.14
3.3  The Relationship  between State Variables  and Economic  Variables
To Investigate  the economic  determinants  of our estimated  state  variables for Mexico  and
Venezuela,  we regressed them on a number  of economic  variables. Given the weeldy  frequency
of the bond  price data which  produced  our state  variable  estimates,  we choose  economic  variables
that could also obtained  at a weekly  frequency: oil prices, the performance  of the domestic  stock
market (the value of the Mexico country fund as traded in New York and an index of the
Venezuela stock market in dollars) and two series of Mexican domestic interest rates (one
denominated  in dollars,  the other in pesos). Oil prices can  be expected  to influence  Mexico's and
Venezuela's ability  to repay. Domestic  stock prices will reflect domestic  market expectations  of
future corporate  profit growth and in that respect  be an indicator  of ability  to repay. The value
of the Mexico  country  fund in New York  will not only reflect expectations  about  Mexico's future
corporate growth but also be an  indication of  investors' perceptions about their ability to
repatriate their earnings and capital (as reflected in the discount  of the fund's price from its net
asset value). Domestic  interest  rates will indicate  the restrictiveness  of Mexican  monetary  policy,
which will reflect Mexico's general access  to fresh foreign funds and its ability to repay.'°
Table 5 presents  the results of (typical)  regressions  of the bond prices and the underlying
state variables on the various economic  variables. The first colunmn  gives the dependent  variable
that is used in a particular regression.  The Table documents  that both bond prices and state
variables are only wealdy related to the economic variables.  Except for  some regression
intercepts,  no one parameter  estimate  is significantly  different from zero.  What is encouraging,
however, is that for both Mexico and Venezuela, the regressions of the state variable on
economic  variables  result in an improvement  in overall fit (R 2 as well as the p-values  for the F-
statistics) compared to  the bond price regressions.  In addition, the signs of the parameter
1 IOks  (1990) finds that the Mexican  domestic interest rate reflects, in addition to
international  interest rates and expectations  of exchange  rate movements,  the fiscal situation  of
the government.  In particular, he finds that the difference  between domestic  bonds that fall
due and Mexico's foreign exchange  reserves is an important  explanatory  variable.15
estimates  using the state variable as dependent  variable are more in line with predictions  from
theoretical  models on the ability  and willingness  of sovereign  countries  to pay.  For example,  in
the case of Mexico  the parameter estimate for the Mexico  country fund using the state variable
is positive while it is negative  for the raw bond prices.  This result is robust to the inclusion  of
other independent  variables as can be seen from the comparing  the first and the last sections  of
Table 5.  Similar results obtain when examining the regression coefficients  on the oil price
change for both Mexico and Venezuela. For the state variable regressions, this coefficient is
positive  and large, while  the corresponding  coefficient  for the raw bond price regressions  is either
small or negative.  Nevertheless, the fit of the regressions remains in general poor.  Other
variables, such as gross reserves, monetary  base, and the amount of domestic  debt that matured
in a given month, were also used as independent  variables.  However, these had even less
explanatory  power, largely because  these variables are only available  at a monthly frequency.
A more formal test was undertaken to check whether the parameter estimates in the
regressions are significantly  different from each other.  Table 6 provides the F-statistics  and p-
values  for pair-wise  comparisons  of equality  of parameter  estimates. For Venezuela  there is some
evidence  that the parameter  estimates  reported in Table  S are significantly  different  between  using
the state variable and the bond prices as dependent  variables. Table 6 also reports the result for
the regression  for Mexico  with only two independent  variables  (country  fund and Pagafes);  in this
case parameter estimates  are also more likely to be different (p-values  of 9 and 12 percent). Our
results taken together, there appears to be evidence  that deriving a state variable  process from
secondary market bond prices leads to a better indicator of a country's underlying payment
capacity.16
4.  Conclusions
This paper has shown  that accounting  for the effects  of concavity  in a developing  country
bond's  payoff structure, as  well as  various bond contract features (including third-party
guarantees), leads to an improved  indicator  of the country's repayment  capacity. Applying the
model to bonds recently issued  by Mexico  and Venezuela,  we find that the estimated  repayment
capacity  behaves, at times, quite differently  from the secondary  market bond prices themselves.
We can attribute some of the variation in payment capacity to exogenous economic  factors.
Thus, the differences we find between secondary  market bond prices and our derived measure
of repayment  capacity  provides suggestive  evidence  that investigations  into the determinants  of
repayment  capacity  that employ  only secondary  market bond prices may be biased.17
Appendix A
This appendix computes  the probability  of default for a bond which contains  a rolling,
partial guarantee  of interest payments. The guarantee  is assumed  to cover r periods of interest
payments  and is assumed  to be used, in full, once  the bond issuer first fails to make an interest
payment.  The state variable, z(t), determines when the guarantee is first employed and
when the bond issuer subsequently  defaults on its promised  payments.  It is assumed that the
guarantee  is used over the period T to T+T if z(t) falls below zero for the first time during any
time within  the interval  T-T  to T.  If z(t) later takes on a value less than or equal to zero at any
time during any future interval t'-7 to t', where t'  >  T + T, then it is assumed that complete
default occurs on all promised  bond payments  over the interval  t' to t'+r.
To derive the risk-neutral  value of payments  for the bond described  above, we first value
the payments  of a bond without a guarantee. Second, we calculate  the value of the guarantee,
alone. By combining  these  two values, we will then obtain  the value of payments  of a bond that
includes  the guarantee.
Valuing the payments for a bond that carries no third-party guarantee requires that we
first compute  the probability  that z(t) is less than zero at any time during the interval  t, to t2where
ti  =  t2 - T.  This measurement  represents  the probability  of default on interest payments  over the
interval t1 to t2+r  for this bond.  To simplify  the following  notation, denote  z7  as tFe value
of the state variable, z(t), at time  t.  Let the current time be to = 0, and assume  z, = z >  0.
Recall that the state variable, z(t), is assumed  to be an arithmetic  Brownian  motion process with
drift  and standard  deviation  v.  Denote 0(t1 ,t,) as the event that z(t) takes the value of zero (or
passes through zero) at least once during the interval t, to t2. One can also think of this event
as z(t) being 'absorbed'  at the origin, where zero is an absorbing  barrier.  Thenis
(Pmnin(z(t))  C 0,  te(t 1 2))  =  P(z 1 COl  +  P(z 1 >O)P(0(t 1 -tV1z1 >  O))
(A.1)  N  (1  )  + fo;((t 11tV zj)f(zljz(0)'z)dzj
where  N(.) denotes  the standard  normal  distribution  function  and f is the conditional  density
function  of z(t), given  by
(A.2)  f(zj1 z(0)=z)=  ((Zi  u  Pti)
where  n(v)  is the standard  normal  density  function.
P(O(t 1,t2)Izj is the probability  of z(t) being "absorbed"  at the zero boundary  over the
interval  (t 1,t,), given  it equals  z, > 0 at time  t1. This  distribution  is given  by Ingersoll  (1987)
p. 353  equation  (34b).
(A.3)  P(O(t,lzll  = N(zl-")  +-22N  -+
Substituting  (A.2)  and (A.3)  into (A.  1), we have
P{min(z(t))  < 0, te(t 1,t2)J = N(  IZP)  +
(A.4)  art,
rfjN(  Zl  )  +  ___  _!  1-fs| 
The°abovintegrLcanbe  simplie  (,  s  G  (  A  to  oa
'Me above integral can be simplified  (e.g., see Geske (1979)  p. 80) to obtain19
P(Min(z(t))  < 0, te(t 1 2))  =
N(-z-tt  )  + N 2 (z+Pt,  -Z-It 2
(A.5)  art,  ~  at  i " yA2
;N2  N(Z-p1  ;  s  - )
where  N2(x,y,p)  is the  standard  normal  bivariate  distribution  function  for random  variables  x and
y having  correlation  coefficient,  p.  Hence,  (A.5)  gives  the probability  that a bond without  a
guarantee  will default,  making  no payment,  during  the time interval  t2 to t2 2 + r. One  minus
this probability  times the value of the (default-free)  promised  payment  on the bond over the
interval  t 2to t2 +  T then  gives  us the value  of the payments  on a bond  that carries  no third-party
guarantee.
Our second  step  is to compute  the value  of the third-party,  rolling  guarantee.  The risk-
neutral  of the guarantee  applied  to bond  payments  over the interval  from  t 2 to t2 +  T is equal  to
the promised  bond payments  over this interval  times the probability  of the guarantee  being
exercised. This  probability  of exercise  is the probability  that z(t) first equals  zero during  the
interval  t, =  t2 - T to t2, i.e., the  probability  that  z(t)  is 'absorbed" at the  zero  boundary  between
t- and t2. This probability  can also  be thought  of as being  equal  to the difference  in the first
passage  (below  the zero  boundary)  probabilities  of z(t) at t2and  t 1. The  probability  of z(t) being
"absorbed"  at the zero  boundary  from  time  0 to time  t2 is
(A.6)  P(0(0,t2)Izi =  N (  t )  2  ( Zi  )
while  the lower  probability  of z(t)  being  absorbed  at the zero  boundary  from  0 to time  t, is20
(A.7)  P(O(0,tj)IzI  = N(.....Ut1)  a  2l;  N)
The difference  between  (A.6) and (A.7) is the probability  of the guarantee  being exercised
beginning  at date t2. Hence,  this probability  times  the value  of the promised  payments  on the
bond  over the interval  t2to t2 + T Is  the value  of the guarantee  for this time  period.
Using  (A.5). (A.6),  and  (A.7),  we see  that  the risk-neutral  value  of the bond's  payments
over  the interval  t2to t2 +  s  iS  equal  to their  default-free  value  times  the expression
_I_tI  Z+At  'Z"tW 2
-N(zl  - ____
-2PWG2N 2(Z  5it 1 -Z+It 2 ,  +-
N(  _zPt2  (-  N  -Z  +  0e21W4  -Pt  -z+gAt'
(A.8)  )  N[N  +  eN(  )
N (Z+Pt  + N (Z  )2  - N(22  -A)  - N2(Z  Ptl,  -Z  /i  /
+  Z-ph  -Z+____  -z+It 2~  N  -Z'~ [-  N2(  ,  +  - t 2 - ,/E:/)+  N  (  ) ,  (
Based  on properties  of the univariate  and bivariate  normal  distributions  (see Zelen  and Severo
(1972)  p. 936),  the above  expression  simplifies  to21
(+A  -ZgAt1 Z+jAt2
(A.9)
- e-2R4 2 (-z+t 1 Z  -
Hence,  (A.9)  is  the  probability  of the  bondholder  receiving  the  bond's  promised  payments
during  the interval  t2 to t2 + r.22
Appendix B
This appendix describes the extended Kalman Filter technique  that is used to obtain
(approximate)  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of the state variables, z,, and their expected  change
per unit time, p.
Recall  that equation  (5) in the text describes  the measurement  equation  of our state space
system where V, is the n dimensional  vector of observed  secondary  market prices of debt of types
i, i =  1, ..., n, observed at time t and v,  is the corresponding  n-vector  of "true"  debt prices.  e,
is an n-vector  of measurement  errors which is assumed  to be serially  uncorrelated  and distributed
as-N(O,R). Equation (3) in the text gives the corresponding  state transition  equation.
The extended Kalman filter uses the same simple recursive computational  technique as
the standard  Kalman  filter, but linearizes  the system's measurement  equation  around the time t-At
conditional  mean of zt, denoted  2  using a Taylor series expansion:
(B. 1)  V{,(Z 1 )  V  Vt (*httJ)  +  (Zt  - kfAt)  X
hiis  estimation  technique  is now briefly described  below.
Define  V, as an n-dimensional  vector of prediction  errors or 'innovations' in V,.
(B.2)  tt  =vt  Vt - vt(t-it-At)
where
(B.3)  &-Mt-m  Itt  + &-atlt-at  =  lAt  + EtA-t  Nz-AtIV-^t.V. 2At.  IVOl23
is the predicted  level  of z, given  information  at time  t-At. Define  G, as the variance  of z, given
observations  on V, up until  time  t, i.e.,
(B.4)  Gt = E [(z,-
and define  H as the nxn  covariance  matrix  of %. Then  the recursive  equations  of the Extended
Kalman  filter can  be written  as
(B.5)  ~ot  =  Ot-A  + At
(B.6)  H, =  +  +  R
(B.7)  It  = Ot  + km^  + ottR  nt
(B.8)  ct = Ot  - dttWoA
where  V.  is an nxl vector  whose  ith element,  p  equals
OB.9)  av t)L
C)Z.
Note  that we can also compute  the formula  for the derivative  Ov'88z,,  so computing  this Taylor
approximation  is fairly straightforward. Using this linearization,  the recursive  estimation
technique  proceeds  in the same  manner  as the standard  Kalman  filter.24
Given starting estimates  of zD  and Go, equations (B.2), (B.5), (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8)
allow us to recursively compute  the sequence  of innovations,  %,,  and their covariance  matrices,
H,. The log-likelihood  function  for these innovations  is
(B.10)  L  - =Lt  =  - .(0oglll  +  il  )
t  t
Using a numerical iteration technique, the parameters 1i and R that maximize (B.10) can be
found.  Given these parameters, we can then compute "smoothed"  estimates  of time series for
z,. Smoothed  estimates  of the z,'s are optimal  estimates  based on the full sample  of observations,
V,, not just those preceding time t.  (See Anderson  and Moore (1979) or Harvey (1981) for a
discussion  of this technique.)25
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(Weekly Log Differences)
Mexico  Mm  Standard  Deviation  Number of Observations
Par  0.005025  0.026026  62
Discount  0.003643  0.017839  62
Venezuela
Par  0.006832  0.018472  43
Discount  0.004181  0.015318  43
Note: Data obtained from Salomon Brothers.29
Table 2: State Variable Process Estimates: Mexico and Venezuela
Mexico
Variable  SD  T  Sig.
Drift  -0.2227  0.0325  6.85  *
V/r, 1 1.7945  0.1741  10.31  *
Vr22  0.0000  0.3871  0.00
P12 -0.2487  0.00
Ln likelihood:  -2.06212  130.4005
Venezuela
Variable  SD  T  Sig.
Drift  -0.1467  0.1267  1.16
1.5757  0.7346  2.14  *
-.  Vr22  0.7296  0.7378  0.99
P1 2 -0.9999  11.9286  0.08
Ln likelihood:  -2.1913130
Table  3: Statistics  on the Sample  Estimates  of zlu
(Log  Differences)
Mean  Standard  Deviation
Mexico  0.012325  0.070417
Venezuela  0.016894  0.056970
Table 4: Correlations  between  Underlying  State Variables
and Economic  Variables
(Log first differences  for bond prices,
first differences  for the state variable)
Mexico  Discount  State
Par  0.72607  0.63234
Discount  0.84453
Venezuela  Discount  State
Par  0.44497  0.52940
Discount  0.7131231
Table 5: Regressions of State Economic Variables and Bond Prices on Variables
(State variables as first differences
bond prices as log first differences)
Mexico  Intercept  Fund  WTI  CETES  PAGAF  R2 F-stat
ES  (p-
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~v  alu e)
State  0.396  0.276  0.050  6.004  0.036  0.073  1.117
(1.751)  (1.058)  (0.256)  (0.854)  (1.441)  (0.36)
Par  0.035  -0.055  0.030  0.0005  -0.003  0.023  0.331
___  (1.75O1)  (0.960)  0.698  (0.426)  (0.560)  (0.87)
Discount  0.055  -0.032  -0.014  0.0006  -0.005  0.049  0.733
(1.625)  (0.826)  (0.469)  (0.842)  (1.343)  (0.57)
Venezuela  _  _ 
State  0.033  0.226  - 0.036  1.528
(2.013)  (1.236)  (0.22)
Par  0.007  -0.020  - 0.010  0.397
_  (2.312)  (0.634)  _  0.53)
Discount  0.039  0.015  - 0.008  0.330
(1.675)  (0.568)  (0.57)
Mexico  _  r  _  __=
State  0.260  0.240  - -0.017  0.059  1.843
(1.720)  (0.987)  (1.55)  (0.17)
Par  0.017  -0.043  - -0.0009  0.012  0.365
(0.511)  (0.807)  (0.340)  (0.70)
Discount  0.033  -0.028  - -0.0022  0.035  1.061
(1.463)  (0.772)  (1.298)  (0.35)
Note:  t-atiaes  in parenthesis.
Fund  is the weeldy  rate of return  on the Mexico  Fund.
WTI  ias  the Weat  Texas Intermediate  oil price.
CETES  is interest  rate  on peso-denominated,  28-days  Mexican  govemnment  debt.
Pagafes  is the interest  rate on a dollar indexed,  28-days  Mexican  govemrnment  debt.32
Table 6:  Test of Identical Coefficients
Mexico  F  p value
Ss;ate  - Par  1.53  0.21
State - Discount  1.30  0.28
Venezuela
State - Par  2.18  0.15
State  - Discount  1.63  0.21
Mexico
State - Par  2.55  0.09
State - Discount  2.19  0.12
Note: P -stastc
values  and probability  > F.Figure  1
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